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Within the American judicial system, the notions of free
speech and equality are cherished judicial ideals. However, in
relation to homophobic hate speech' regulation, these two concepts
often manifest in stark opposition to one another. The First
Amendment protects the freedom of speech,2 thereby providing
some protection for offensive speech. Yet, the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees equal protection of the laws, affording
protection for victims of offensive speech,3 which often places the
First and Fourteenth Amendments at odds. Homophobic hate
speech is one manifestation of the hate propaganda that permeates
the lives of many Americans, causing significant harm to individuals
and to groups. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender ("LGBT")
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2007.
1. "Homophobic hate speech" refers to speech and propaganda against
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered persons.
2. U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech .... ").
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person
the equal protection of the laws .... "); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V
("No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ... ").
4. See generally THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST
SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer &
Richard Delgado eds., 1995) (analyzing how various forms of hate propaganda
have valid and detrimental effects on the subordinated groups they victimize).
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persons are one group of people who must navigate against the tide
of legal protection that allows such hate speech.'
LGBT persons face a further hurdle in challenging the First
Amendment protection of hate speech as they seek First
6Amendment protection of their own expressive speech. In most
cases, an LGBT-identified person must express him or herself
verbally or otherwise in order to affirm his or her sexual identity. It
is this speech, however, that leaves an LGBT person open to attack
from bigots. This Note explores how the First Amendment is used
both to protect homophobic hate speech and to more narrowly
protect homosexual expressive speech. There is, however, a
broader implication. In most cases, homophobic hate speech arises
only in response to LGBT expressive speech.7  Expanding
protection for LGBT expressive speech raises the question of
whose rights should prevail when protection of LGBT expressive
speech collides with protection of homophobic hate speech.
Part I analyzes the current state of First Amendment hate
speech protection and the arguments for and against stronger hate
speech regulation. Since the current debate centers mostly on racist
and sexist hate speech, rather than homophobic hate speech, it is
necessary to analogize these arguments to apply to the LGBT
experience. Part I concludes that there is little hope in the
immediate future to push LGBT-affirmative legal reforms through
regulation of homophobic hate speech. In Part II, this Note turns
to LGBT expressive speech, where courts offer significantly more,
5. Id. In their analysis, the editors focus on women, people of color, and
Jewish people along with gay men and lesbians.
6. "Homosexual expressive speech" refers to the various ways that
LGBT persons make this aspect of their identity known to others, ranging
from public displays of affection to advocating for homosexual rights. The
expression can be reserved for certain individuals, or made to the public in
general.
7. Those who wish to harm LGBT persons with homophobic hate speech
may not do so directly without first having knowledge of their sexual
orientation. Because LGBT persons must express themselves to reveal their
identities, it follows that homophobic hate speech can only be a result of
LGBT expressive speech. This is not to say that LGBT persons who have not
expressed their sexual identities are not harmed, at least psychologically, by
homophobic hate speech.
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although still limited protection to LGBT persons. Part II also
suggests several strategies that courts could follow that would lead
to expanded protection for LGBT expressive speech. This Note
concludes with the normative proposal that expanded protection of
LGBT expressive speech should lead to increased restrictions of
homophobic hate speech.
I. HATE SPEECH
A. How Hate Speech Harms
Support for regulation of hate speech comes most often in
the context of racially-motivated hate speech. Professor Richard
Delgado, a preeminent civil rights law professor at the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law and critical race theorist, observed that
stigmatization based on association with a particular social group is
pervasively harmful.8 Individuals who suffer such stigmatization,
Delgado argues, suffer from "feelings of humiliation, isolation, and
self-hatred." 9  The result is that these individuals "often are
hypersensitive and anticipate pain at the prospect of contact with
'normals."" The harm that these victims suffer affects them
physically as well." Further, these abuses affect society as a whole"
and are similar to other harms for which our system provides legal
8. Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
9. Id. at 137.
10. Id. Racial minorities are further alienated from "normals," or
members of the majority, because "[r]acial tags deny minority individuals the
possibility of neutral behavior in cross-racial contacts, thereby impairing the
victims' capacity to form close interracial relationships." Id.
11. Id. at 137-39.
12. Id. at 139-40. Delgado reasons that "[r]acism is a breach of the ideal
of egalitarianism, that 'all men are created equal' and each person is an equal
moral agent, an ideal that is a cornerstone of the American moral and legal
system." Id. at 140.
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redress.13 Thus, Delgado argues that tort remedies should be made
available to victims of hate speech.
Professor Mari Matsuda, another preeminent critical race
theorist and professor, recommends criminal sanctions for hate
14speech . She notes that the "places where the law does not go to
redress harm have tended to be the places where women, children,
people of color, and poor people live." 5 Matsuda compares
American and international approaches to hate speech regulation.
She argues that the international standard "recognizes that avoiding
the spread of hatred is a legitimate object of the law and that some
forms of racist expression are properly criminalized.' 6  Matsuda
13. Id at 150. The bases underlying this tort action are similar to those
for "assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation,
and various statutory and constitutional causes of action. However, each of
these doctrines has limitations which render it an unreliable means of redress
for the victims of racial insults." Id. For example, assault theories can be
inadequate because they require actual fear of injury or touching. Assault,
therefore, would not cover encounters which do not rise to this level of threat,
but serve only to humiliate and degrade. Id. at 150-51 (describing one such
encounter from Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.
1967)).
14. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
15. Id. at 2322.
16. Id. at 2347. Matsuda argues: "The call for a formal, legal-structural
response to racist speech goes against the long-standing and healthy American
distrust of government power. It goes against an American tradition of
tolerance that is precious in the sense of being both valuable and fragile." Id.
at 2322. The international model of hate speech regulation would require that
states:
Shall declare as an offence punishable by law all
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or
hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as
all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against
any race or group of persons of another colour or
ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance
to racist activities, including the financing thereof;
Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and
also organized and all other propaganda activities,
which promote and incite racial discrimination, and
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argues from the victim's perspective and proposes that "actionable
racist speech" should include only those messages that fulfill certain
criteria, 7 which thereby prevents the "opening of the dreaded
floodgates of censorship."'
Focus on the victim's perspective is missing from the United
States Supreme Court hate speech doctrine as evidenced by its 1992
decision of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.' In this case, St. Paul's Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance criminalized, as a misdemeanor, any
disorderly conduct placing a "symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti ... which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender."2 o The city of St.
Paul charged Robert A. Viktora under this ordinance for setting
ablaze a crude cross in the yard of his African-American neighbors'
home.2'  The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the statute as
constitutional.22 Citing Professor Matsuda, the court reasoned:
Burning a cross in the yard of an African
American family's home is deplorable conduct
that the City of St. Paul may without question
prohibit. The burning cross is itself an
shall recognize participation in such organization or
activities as an offence punishable by law; [and]
Shall not permit public authorities or public
institutions, national or local, to promote or incite
racial discrimination.
Id. at 2341 (quoting the International Convention of the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195).
17. Id. at 2357. The three criteria are: (1) the message is of racial
inferiority; (2) the message is directed against a historically oppressed group;
and (3) the message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading. Though Matsuda
deals with racist hate speech, the reasoning of Matsuda and others is applied
here to make a case for regulation of homosexual hate speech. See discussion
infra Part I.D.
18. Id. at 2358.
19. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
20. Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE §292.02 (1990)).
21. Id.
22. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1991).
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unmistakable symbol of violence and hatred
based on virulent notions of racial supremacy.
It is the responsibility, even the obligation, of
diverse communities to confront such notions
in whatever form they appear.23
The United States Supreme Court had a clear opportunity
to follow the Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning by adopting
the victim's perspective; instead, the Court struck down the
ordinance as unconstitutional. While all nine Justices joined in the
result, their reasons were sharply divided. Though the five-member
majority, led by Justice Scalia, adopted the Minnesota Supreme
Court's narrowing of the ordinance's reach to only "fighting
words," it still did not survive the Court's prohibition on content-
based speech limitations.24  According to Justice Scalia, the
government may not make speech regulations "based on hostility -
or favoritism - towards the underlying message expressed.,
25
In the four-member concurrence, Justice White disagreed
with the majority, arguing that the ordinance dealt with "fighting
words, 26 and based on its narrow tailoring, would have survived
strict scrutiny. Justice White reaches the same conclusion as the
28majority, however, because he finds the ordiance to be overbroad.
Though it does "reach categories of speech that are unprotected,"
he believes, "it also criminalizes a substantial amount of expression
that - however repugnant - is shielded by the First Amendment.,
29
Charles Lawrence, a highly regarded constitutional law
scholar and critical race theorist, observed that the Court focused
exclusively on "the First Amendment rights of the crossburners,"
23. Id. at 508 (citing Matsuda, supra note 14, at 2365-66).
24. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-82 (1992). The Court
noted that content-based regulations are "presumptively invalid." Id. at 382
(citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); Consol. Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N. Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972)).
25. Id. at 386.
26. Id. at 399-403 (White, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 403-08 (White, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 411 (White, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 413.
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without considering "this black family's right to live where they
pleased, or their right to associate with their neighbors."'
Lawrence, like Matsuda, focuses on the victim's perspective,
arguing that face-to-face racial insults "are undeserving of
constitutional protection for two reasons., 3' First, the "immediacy1 2
of the injurious impact" is a clear and present harm to be avoided.
Second, hate speech serves to defeat a major purpose of the First
Amendment - to "foster the greatest amount of speech., 33 Hate
speech silences the victim because it is "experienced as a blow, not
a proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that
dialogue will follow."3
Lawrence states that Justice Scalia's reasoning turned "the
First Amendment on its head, transforming an act intended to
silence through terror and intimidation into an invitation to join a
public discussion. '' Further, Lawrence asserts that Justice Scalia
"invites [the crossburner] to burn again" through legal legitimizing
of the "terroristic act" as protected political speech.36 Despite the
academic commentary and injurious effects of hate speech, it is
30. Charles Lawrence, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence:
Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787,
788-89 (1992) [hereinafter "Lawrence, Crossburning"]. The violation on the
family's rights comes from the total effects of the racist incidents they had
suffered since moving into the white neighborhood:
They were the only black family on the block. Two
weeks after they had settled into their predominantly
white neighborhood, the tires on both their cars were
slashed. A few weeks later, one of their cars' windows
was shattered, and a group of teenagers had walked
past their house and shouted "nigger" at their nine-
year-old son. And now this burning cross.
Id. at 787.
31. Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist




34. Id. Lawrence adds that racial insults "are undeserving of first
amendment protection because the perpetrator's intention is not to discover
the truth or initiate dialogue but to injure the victim." Id.
35. Lawrence, Crossburning, supra note 30, at 790.
36. Id. at 790-91.
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clear that the First Amendment offers a considerable safe harbor
for those speaking freely.
B. First Amendment Opposition to Hate Speech Regulation
Opponents of restrictions to hate speech often approach the
issue from a civil libertarian perspective. Calvin R. Massey, a
renowned constitutional law scholar, asserts that the "soul" of
American self-governance is the "individualistic paradigm, which
supports the central tenet of free expression within public discourse
as an indispensable means of securing autonomous self-
governance. 3 7  Massey embraces the slippery-slope viewpoint,
arguing that the effort to suppress hate speech while "undoubtedly
well-meaning, threatens slow erosion of the pillars upon which
autonomous self-governance has been erected." Outlining the
justifications for free expression, Massey defines two broad
categories: free expression as a means to some other end or free
expression as an end in itself.39
Massey's survey of the goals that free expression is meant to
achieve offers a comprehensive picture of the opposition to hate
speech regulation. Free expression is meant to ensure six different
goals: self-governance; the search for truth;41 the development of
37. Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the
Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 194-95
(1992).
38. Id. at 197. Massey contends that "by eradicating hate speech to
preserve cultural diversity, at the price of tolerating content-based curbs on
public discourse, we would open the door to forms of cultural authoritarianism
that might have far less benign objectives than preventing racists from spewing
foul invective." Id.
39. Id. at 115.
40. Id. at 116-17. Massey believes that "[i]f the people are to govern,
they must choose; to do so, they must be informed; and to be informed,
governments must be disabled from restricting the dissemination of ideas." Id.
at 117.
41. Id. at 122. Massey concedes that "free expression provides no
guarantee of the victory of truth," but argues that "the lack of free expression
is surely no improvement." Id. at 124.
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42 43moral virtue; tolerance; pressure release;" and finally, to serve as
a checking value against the abuse of power by public officials. 41 In
the end, the common theme through each of these rationales, and
the most important purpose of free expression, is "autonomous self-
governance."
Massey asserts that the idea of free expression as an end in
itself is a newer concept emerging from "the larger idea that all
persons are entitled to realize their full potential., 47 Massey points
to judicial acceptance of this notion in Cohen v. California,4 where
the Court upheld the right of an individual to wear, in public, a
jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft." 49 By accepting
that the only purpose of the expression was actually expressing the
idea, the holding reflects acceptance of "free expression" as an end
itself. The argument for protection of expression as valuable in
itself presents a fairly strong argument against content-based
speech prohibition. As Matsuda writes, "[t]he strongest argument
against criminalization of racist speech is that it is content-based."5 °
All of these rationales support the American ideal of First
Amendment primacy, representing "certain values that are part of
the American structure of government and the American
commitment to political and civil rights."5  Indeed, the
jurisprudence in this area also reflects this First Amendment
primacy. Speech codes enacted to combat harassment are often
42. Id. at 126-27. For the development of moral virtue, Massey observes
that this "rationale for free speech focuses primarily upon the moral and
spiritual autonomy of each individual as a speaker." Id. at 127.
43. Id. at 129. Massey argues that by increasing tolerance, "we will
ultimately treat each of our individual cohabitants with greater respect." Id. at
130.
44. Id. at 130. Massey believes that a society with such pressure release is
a society where "[s]ocial peace is to be had by free speech." Id.
45. Id. at 131. ("The courts have accepted this idea most readily when
engaged in grafting onto the free speech guarantee a right of press access to
trials and other public judicial proceedings.").
46. Id. at 132.
47. Id.
48. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
49. Id. at 16.
50. Matsuda, supra note 14, at 2351.
51. Id. at 2353.
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held to be unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment
because of their overbreadth. In Saxe v. State College Area School• 52
District, the district court's holding that harassment is not entitled
to First Amendment protection was reversed by the Third Circuit.53
The Third Circuit found that the district's anti-harassment policy4
violated the Constitution for two reasons. First, the Third Circuit
chastised the district court's conclusion that this harassment is not
protected activity, suggesting that some harassment is
constitutionally protected.55 Second, the Third Circuit found that
16the policy was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court
then euphemistically declared that when "laws against harassment
attempt to regulate oral or written expression on [topics such as
deeply offensive speech], however detestable the views expressed
may be, we cannot turn a blind eye to the First Amendment
implications."57  Through this style of reasoning, courts use the
Massey-type First Amendment primacy to prohibit legislatures
from enacting restrictions on harassment and hate speech.
52. 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
53. Id. at 206.
54. The policy defined harassment as "verbal or physical conduct based
on one's actual or perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender,
sexual orientation, disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has
the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a student's educational
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment."
Id. at 202.
55. Id. at 206.
There is of course no question that non-expressive,
physically harassing conduct is entirely outside the
ambit of the free speech clause. But there is also no
question that the free speech clause protects a wide
variety of speech that listeners may consider deeply
offensive, including statements that impugn another's
race or national origin or that denigrate religious
beliefs.
Id. (citations omitted).
56. Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214-15 (3d Cir.
2001) (holding that "'any unwelcome verbal ... conduct which offends... an
individual because of' some enumerated personal characteristic" is not
sufficient justification for prohibiting the speech because someone might be
offended).
57. Id. at 206.
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C. Reconciling the First Amendment with Hate Speech Regulation:
The Limited Tolerance of Campus Speech Codes
Advocates of increased hate speech regulation recognize
the tension with traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. The
freedom of speech is a fundamental constitutional right.' 9 A state
may only interfere with fundamental rights if the regulation is•60
narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling government interest.
In examining how these advocates deal with the substantial issue of
First Amendment implications, it is useful to survey the scholarly,
judicial, and public attention that campus speech codes receive.
Campus speech codes are significant with regard to hate speech
regulation for two reasons. First, speech codes affect a very limited
jurisdiction, and second, speech codes are arguably necessary for
universities to fulfill their missions as diverse, democratic
institutions of learning.
Proponents of hate speech regulation offer various models
which they argue are compatible with at least some form of First
Amendment jurisprudence. J. Peter Byrne, a constitutional law
scholar and professor at Georgetown Law, asserts that the
Constitution tolerates university-specific speech codes, within
certain limits.6' Though "the state should not be allowed to prohibit
racial insults," Byrne asserts that the "university's relationship to
the speech of its members is fundamentally different from the
state's., 62 His prohibition on state regulation emerges
not because [racial insults] have any merit as
speech, but because of the general concern that
the state should not act as a censor of
expression it concludes to be worthless or
pernicious. Government does not possess
58. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
59. U.S. CONST. amend I; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1971).
60. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
61. J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University,
79 GEO. L.J. 399 (1991).
62. Id. at 416. Byrne includes both public and private universities in his
analysis, but finds that public universities have much less power to regulate
hate speech. Id. at 422.
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either the ability or the principled criteria
necessary to distinguish between speech that is
under attack merely because it is resented by
the majority and that which is objectively
worthless. 3
Because of its commitment to intellectual development, the
university may prohibit "[i]nfluences that interfere with this goal."'
Therefore, Byrne concludes, the university is obliged to protect its
students from racial insults, which "obviously burden the ability of
targets to pursue their studies."65 However, "the first amendment
renders state universities powerless to punish speakers for
advocating any idea in a reasoned manner," because university
discourse is the best way to deal with these ideas.66
Alan Brownstein, a constitutional law scholar and professor
at University of California at Davis School of Law, argues that only
those speech codes that focus on protecting the victim, rather than
prohibiting the message, will pass constitutional muster.
67
Brownstein compares his proposal for campus speech codes with
the judicial tolerance and constitutionality of telephone harassment
laws.6  He contends that the factors rendering telephone
harassment impermissible even apply to a public face-to-face racial
63. Id.
64. Id. at 420.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 422.
67. Alan E. Brownstein, Hate Speech and Harassment: The
Constitutionality of Campus Codes that Prohibit Racial Insults, 3 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 179, 179-80 (1994). Brownstein describes two categories of
speech codes. The first "includes laws designed to prevent the insidious
message of hate propaganda from directly or indirectly influencing the beliefs,
attitudes, and ultimately, the actions of the speakers' audience." Id. The
second "involves regulations intended to protect individual members of
victimized groups from being verbally abused by racist or sexist epithets and
insults." Id. Because laws that fall into the first category "raise particularly
acute constitutional problems and violate current First Amendment doctrine,"
Brownstein addresses the constitutionality of only those laws that fall into the
second category. Id.
68. Id. at 192-206.
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insult that takes place on campus. 69 The insult is private expression
requiring the victim "as a particular individual to be the recipient of
[the] hate speech."70 Another privacy dimension implicated is the
public exposure of the victim's powerful emotional response to the
71
harassment. Because Brownstein posits that content
discrimination is necessary for identifying what constitutes verbal
harassment, even R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,7 "should not preclude a
university per se from adopting a carefully defined prohibition
against verbal harassment.,
73
D. The Unique Problems with the Regulation of Homophobic Hate
Speech
The vast majority of experiments with hate speech
regulation are designed to deal with racist hate speech. While
racism is an important and pervasive problem, so too is• 74
heterosexism. This Note proposes that the same arguments
69. Id. at 203. In defense of telephone harassment laws, courts have held
that: (1) harassing telephone calls are conduct rather than speech; (2) there is
a "substantial privacy interest" at stake; (3) the intent to harass is a required
factor to render calls harassing; and (4) repetition is another requisite factor.
Id. at 194-202.
In response, Brownstein argues that: (1) it is the content that renders the
call harassing; (2) residential privacy alone does not shield an individual from
receiving other types of disturbing communications, and the laws apply to calls
to non-private locations as well; (3) there are many types of intentionally
annoying calls that are protected by the First Amendment; and (4) "[n]othing
in the First Amendment suggests . . . that a person's freedom of speech is
intrinsically limited to saying something only once," and this is really a
manifestation of a person's autonomy interest in not receiving a
communication. Id.
70. Id. at 203.
71. Id.
72. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
73. Brownstein, supra note 67, at 206-07.
74. "Heterosexism" describes:
[A]n ideological system that denies, denigrates, and
stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behavior,
identity, relationship, or community. Using the term
heterosexism highlights the parallels between antigay
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supporting increased regulation of racist hate speech can also be
used to support increased regulation of homophobic hate speech.
Serious, daunting obstacles face proponents of hate speech
regulation. In other areas where minorities seek racial equality,
they have made significant progress, gaining noteworthy federal
legislative protections." Therefore, where racial minorities seek
hate speech protection, they have a vast background of progress
and momentum to utilize in their pursuit and a similar
sentiment and other forms of prejudice, such as racism,
antisemitism, and sexism.
Like institutional racism and sexism, heterosexism
pervades societal customs and institutions. It operates
through a dual process of invisibility and attack.
Homosexuality usually remains culturally invisible;
when people who engage in homosexual behavior or
who are identified as homosexual become visible, they
are subject to attack by society.
Examples of heterosexism in the United States include
the continuing ban against lesbian and gay military
personnel; widespread lack of legal protection from
antigay discrimination in employment, housing, and
services; hostility to lesbian and gay committed
relationships, recently dramatized by passage of
federal and state laws against same-gender marriage;
and the existence of sodomy laws in more than one-
third of the states.
Gregory Herek, Sexual Orientation: Science, Education, and Policy,
Definitions: Homophobia, Heterosexism, and Sexual Prejudice,
http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/rainbow/html/prej-defn.html (citation omitted)
(last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
75. For instance, in 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2005), which was meant to guarantee equal opportunities in
various settings. This is "the most important civil rights legislation ever," and
"the first legislation to proscribe racial discrimination in employment." ROY
L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES, 399
(2000). Its protected classes include race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin, and it primarily encompasses voting, public accommodations,
education, and employment. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6.
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extrapolation can be made for women seeking protection against
76
sexist speech.
While the Civil Rights Act includes many protected
classes,77 a classification for sexual orientation is not mentioned. At
the time when racial minorities and women were organizing mass
demonstrations and accomplishing significant policy change,
LGBT-identified Americans still faced "extreme stigma. ' '78 Indeed,
it is widely accepted that the gay and lesbian rights movement did
not even begin until 1969, the year of the Stonewall rebellion.79
Although there has been recent emphasis on federal protection of
the rights of racial minorities and women, many LGBT rights still• 80
lack federal protection.
Further, it is generally accepted that racial minorities and
women have been subjugated by the dominant white, male classes
76. The 1964 Civil Rights Act includes sex as a protected class. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-2000h-6. Previous justice movements for racial minorities and
women have obviously not been completely successful. Employment
discrimination, in particular, has simply changed forms. "It has become more
subtle and less overt. No longer does one encounter signs in store windows
that read 'Latinos need not apply' or company rules that outright bar African
American employees from being promoted." BROOKS ET AL., supra note 75,
at 397.
77. See supra note 75.
78. Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695,
1700 (1993).
79. Id. at 1702 n.33. Hunter describes the event as follows:
The event occurred at the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich
Village, when the bar's patrons spontaneously resisted
what the police no doubt considered a routine raid.
The resistance was all the more dramatic because most
of the patrons were drag queens in full dress, although
one observer credits a lesbian among the crowd with
being the first to call on her compadres to fight back.
The ensuing struggle became a pitched battle between
gays and police that continued for hours in the streets
of the Village.
Id. at 1702-03 (citing Lucian Truscott IV, Gay Power Comes to Sheridan
Square, VILLAGE VOICE, July 3, 1969, at 1, 18.
80. A notable exception is an executive order that protects federal
employees from employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Exec. Order No. 13152, 65 Fed. Reg. 26115 (May 2, 2000).
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for centuries.8" While heterosexism may seem relatively new in
comparison, its recent emergence is related to the fact that LGBT
community members have started to "come out '' 2 only recently.83
Therefore, while it may seem that LGBT-identified persons have
experienced a shorter history of oppression, they have been widely
persecuted since they became more public about their sexual
orientations. 84
Though the LGBT community lacks longstanding historical
oppression, its members deserve the same protection as other
oppressed groups. Members of the LGBT community suffer the
same intimidation, threats, and violence that hate speech
promulgates against other minorities.n Accordingly, proposals for
81. Brooks illustrates "the American race problem, society's longest
running social and moral dilemma" with a short story:
Two groups-one white, one black-are playing a game
of poker. They have been playing the same game for
some 300 years, during which time the white group has
cheated on numerous occasions. The white group now
announces that "from this day forward, we will stop
cheating." "That's fine," the black group responds, "but
what are you going to do about all those poker chips
that have stacked up on your side of the table all these
years." "We're going to give them to current and future
members of our group," the white group replies. "So,
whites will continue to benefit from past cheating; that's
not fair," the black group insists.
BROOKS ET AL., supra note 75, at 3.
82. When members of the LGBT community make their sexual
orientation known to their friends, family, co-workers, or members of the
public, it is generally referred to as "coming out."
83. Secrecy was the key in the early movement. "Because the focus of the
early cases and legislation was on sexual conduct, privacy became the primary
intellectual bulwark of rights advocates." Hunter, supra note 78, at 1696-97.
84. In the early 1990s, data compiled by the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force "show[ed] that homophobic violence and victimization continue to
be a widespread and critical problem." Martin Kazu Hiraga, Anti-Gay and -
Lesbian Violence, Victimization, and Defamation: Trends, Victimization
Studies, and Incident Descriptions, in THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST
RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY 109, 112 (Laura
Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995).
85. Professor Lawrence relates an incident suffered by one of his gay
male students:
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regulation of hate speech can and should cover homophobic hate
speech. Because it is already recognized as a problem, a solution
can help prevent the need for a long struggle against oppression.
Regardless of the strength of the academic theories and
proposals for hate speech regulation of any type, the legal and
political reality in the United States has prevented the regulations
from taking hold. There are well-reasoned and principled
arguments for the constitutionality of prohibitions of racist hate
speech, and these are equally applicable to homophobic hate
speech.86 The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly held that
the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting
even the most abhorrent hate speech. Although the United States
might accept hate speech regulation in the near future, that is a
tenuous avenue for establishing further LGBT rights.
In response to my request that students describe how
they experienced the injury of racist speech, Michael
told a story of being called "faggot" by a man on a
subway. His description included all of the speech
inhibiting elements I noted previously. He found
himself in a state of semi-shock, nauseous, dizzy,
unable to muster the witty, sarcastic, articulate
rejoinder he was accustomed to making. He suddenly
was aware of the recent spate of gay-bashing in San
Francisco, and how many of these had escalated from
verbal encounters. Even hours later when the shock
resided and his facility with words returned, he realized
that any response was inadequate to counter the
hundreds of years of societal defamation that one word
- "faggot" - carried with it. Like the word "nigger"
and unlike the word "liar," it is not sufficient to deny
the truth of the word's application, to say, "I am not a
faggot." One must deny the truth of the word's
meaning, a meaning shouted from the rooftops by the
rest of the world a million times a day.
Lawrence, If He Hollers, supra note 31, at 455.
86. See supra Parts I.A., I.C.
87. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Police Dep't of the
City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971).
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II. LGBT EXPRESSIVE SPEECH
A. The Significance of LGBT Expressive Speech
Unlike members of other minority groups in the United
States, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender persons must first
express their identity before society becomes aware of his or her
sexual orientation. This type of expression commonly takes the
form of "coming out," where an LGBT-identified person makes
this identity known to selected people or the general public. Nan
D. Hunter, a public health law scholar and professor, clarifies that:
Self-identifying speech does not merely reflect
or communicate one's identity; it is a major
factor in constructing identity. Identity cannot
exist without it. That is even more true when
the distinguishing group characteristics are not
visible, as is typically true of sexual orientation.
Therefore, in the field of lesbian and gay civil
rights, much more so than for most other
equality claims, expression is a component of
the very identity itself."8
A corollary to the idea that LGBT identity is formed at
least partially by expression, is the claim that without expression,
LGBT identity would not fully be realized. Thus, it follows that
barriers to LGBT expressive speech are barriers to LGBT identity.
Accordingly, the stakes for protecting LGBT expression seem to be
much higher because without that protection, LGBT identity itself
is threatened.
88. Hunter, supra note 78, at 1718.
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B. Current Jurisprudence Involving LGBT Expressive Speech
1. Protecting LGBT Expressive Speech in the
University Setting
Generally, courts most often protect expression of sexual
orientation in the context of student organizations in the university
setting. 9 For example, in Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews,
90
the Fourth Circuit required Virginia Commonwealth University to
recognize a student group as "a 'pro-homosexual' political
organization advocating a liberalization of legal restrictions against
the practice of homosexuality and one seeking, by the educational
and informational process, to generate understanding and
acceptance of individuals whose sexual orientation is wholly or
partly homosexual." 9' The Fourth Circuit specifically rejected the
school's assertions that recognition would "increase the opportunity
for homosexual contacts." 92 Quoting Healy v. James,3 the court
noted, "[t]he critical line for First Amendment purposes must be
drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and
action, which is not."94 In Healy, the Supreme Court outlined the
associational right of students and held that there "can be no doubt
that denial of official recognition, without justification, to college
organizations burdens or abridges that associational right."9 5 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit protected LGBT expressive speech, in the form
of student organizations, as part of the First Amendment
associational rights of students.
However, there was an underlying wrinkle in homosexual
student organization cases of the 1970s since homosexual sex acts
were largely proscribed by law during this time period. So,
"[c]ourts and litigators generally treated advocacy of homosexuality
89. Id.
90. 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976).
91. Id. at 164.
92. Id. at 166.
93. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
94. Id. at 192.
95. Id. at 181.
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as advocacy of conduct."'  Therefore, courts in the student
organization cases "quickly and comfortably drew on the
preexisting framework for the analysis of the advocacy of unlawful
conduct, making these easy cases. ''  That framework involved
application of the Brandenburg test,98 which required intentional
incitement to immediate action in order to hold the advocacy itself
to be unlawful." Because the student organizations did not
intentionally incite immediate action, the Fourth Circuit properly
held that their activities passed the Brandenburg test, thereby
protecting their associational rights.
Later, the focus would turn to homosexual expression in
itself, rather than advocacy of conduct, and this simple framework
would be replaced by a much more complicated analysis.m In other
words, where homosexual expression advocates ideas and not
conduct, the courts abandoned this simple test, providing a more
difficult path to protecting expressive rights.' 1
2. Protecting LGBT Expressive Speech in the
Public Employment Setting
When politicians began framing LGBT speech in terms of
advocacy of ideas rather than advocacy of conduct, the debate
shifted to the public employee's right to homosexual expression.
Hunter considers the 1978 Briggs Initiative, '02 the "first political
debate about homosexuality outside urban centers or limited
enclaves like universities," to be the first time that "expression
rather than conduct formed the core of the issue."'0 3 Stealthily
designed to allow the state to "fire gay teachers and thus purge that
group from the schools and from contact with children," the
96. Hunter, supra note 78, at 1702.
97. Id.
98. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
99. Id. at 447-48.
100. Hunter, supra note 78, at 1702.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1703 n.36. The Initiative appeared on the 1978 California
state ballot. Cal. Proposition 6, 3(b)(2) (1978).
103. Id. at 1703 (emphasis added).
2006] PROTECTING HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS 397
Initiative sanctioned the firing of a school employee for any
promotion of homosexuality that might come to the attention of
students or other employees.' 4 The Initiative was defeated, but the
concept that homosexual expressive speech could be considered
political speech or "the advocacy of ideas"'0 5 was established.
Conceptions of LGBT speech had now shifted from
advocacy of conduct to advocacy of ideas. The way courts deal with
expressive rights of LGBT public employees exemplifies the new
jurisprudence that emerged to deal with this shift. For current
disputes involving public employee expression rights, courts turn to
the First Amendment balancing test found in Pickering v. Board of
Education. 6 First, this balancing test involves determining whether
the speech was a matter of public concern.'O If not, the speech is
not protected. If the speech was a matter of public concern, the
court then decides whether it was true or false.'08 If true, the court
moves on to weigh the government's interest in the efficient
provision of public service against the individual's free speech
interest. If false, the speech may still be protected, under a N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan0 9 analysis, where negligent or innocent statements
may be protected, and intentional or reckless statements are not
protected.1
As applied to LGBT expressive speech, the key inquiry is
whether or not the speech is classified as a matter of public concern.
This is often a difficult determination. For example, a Utah federal
court found that a female teacher's revelation to a student that she
was a lesbian involved a matter of public concern and was protected
104. Hunter, supra note 78, at 1703.
105. Id. at 1705. Hunter notes that the Briggs Initiative represented that
the "moment when American politics began to treat homosexuality as
something more than a deviance, conduct, or lifestyle; it marked the
emergence of homosexuality as an openly political claim and as a viewpoint.
That, in turn, laid the foundation for the emergence of a new analysis of
speech about homosexuality." Id. at 1704.
106. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
110. Id. at 279-80.
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by the First Amendment."' The court explained that either the fact
that homosexual identity "is inherently a matter of public concern,"
or that her employer's censorship actions converted the matter into
one of public concern."2 However, the Sixth Circuit held that a
guidance counselor who declared her bisexuality was not engaging
in matters of public concern and thus could be fired for her
comments." 3 Due to the important role that homosexual expressive
speech plays in supporting the rights of LGBT persons as a
subordinated group, this Note contends that homosexual expressive
speech should be considered a matter of public concern. However
it remains unclear whether such speech will be found to meet the
first part of the Pickering test.
3. Protecting LGBT Expressive Speech in the
Local Political Setting
The United States Supreme Court addressed another aspect
of LGBT expression in Romer v. Evans."4  Here, the state of
Colorado, through a statewide ballot initiative, had effectively
repealed any municipal or state antidiscrimination laws, within the
state, that protected individuals with a "homosexual, bisexual, or
lesbian orientation."" 5  The Colorado state courts discussed the
initiative as including a hybrid First Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause issue: its effect on the right of LGBT persons "to
111. Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1284 (D. Utah
1998).
112. Id.
113. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir.
1984). It is curious how the unprotected expression here involved a disclosure
of bisexuality, which is even less mainstream than homosexuality. Also, the
decision came fourteen years prior to the Utah court's ruling. Perhaps
increased acceptance of the homosexual lifestyle and the fact that lesbianism,
rather than bisexuality was disclosed, helps explain the seemingly conflicting
holdings.
114. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
115. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (enforcement permanently enjoined
1996).
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participate equally in the political process."1 16  However, the
Supreme Court ignored the First Amendment claim and decided
the case based on its violation of the Equal Protection Clause
alone."7 The freedom of speech is integral to political participation,
but whether or not First Amendment protection of homosexual
expressive speech has any relationship to LBGT rights to
participate in the political process is still an open question.
4. Protecting LGBT Expressive Speech in
the Military
Compared to the high level of protection that student
organizations receive, the United States military affords little
protection for LGBT expression. The Fourth Circuit, twenty years
after Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews,"8 addressed the
military's "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" policy" 9 in Thomasson v. Perry.'20
The plaintiff, an honorably discharged lieutenant, claimed that the
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment,
and the Due Process Clause. '  The court found that the
classification involved was not suspect, so it only implicated rational
basis review.122 Under rational basis review, the court found a
rational relation between "Don't Ask/Don't Tell" and the
legislative goals of promoting unit cohesion and an environment
free from sexual pressure. 1 3 As for the First Amendment claim, the
court found it rational for a declaration of homosexuality to create
a rebuttable presumption that one has a propensity to engage in
116. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Colo. 1994) (citations
omitted), affd on other grounds, 517 U.S 620 (1996).
117. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
118. 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); see discussion supra Part II.B.1.
119. 10 U.S.C. § 564(b) (2005). Service members, under this policy, may
be investigated and administratively discharged if they: make a statement that
they are lesbian, gay, or bisexual; engage in physical contact with someone of
the same sex for the purposes of sexual gratification; or marry, or attempt to
marry, someone of the same sex. Id.
120. 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
121. Id. at 919.
122. Id. at 928.
123. Id. at 928-31.
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homosexual activity.' 24  Accordingly, the court found, it is
permissible for the policy to require the soldier to overcome the
presumption that he or she engages in homosexual activity in order
to keep his or her job.
1 25
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning mirrors the opinions held by
other courts on the matter. 1 6 This line of cases upholds the
balancing test utilized in the jurisprudence of public employee
expression: that governmental interest can and sometimes does
outweigh individual expressive rights. 1 7 That is, a government
interest such as military unit cohesion easily outweighs a person's
right to express his or her sexual identity. Because it applies only to
the expressive rights of LGBT persons, the government
subordinates LGBT speech to a level that is below that of
heterosexual speech.
To avoid this devastating result, the law should protect
LGBT speech to the same extent that it protects heterosexual
speech. In the public employment as well as the military settings,
individual expression of heterosexual identity is not a legitimate
reason to terminate the speaker's employment. The government's
interest in either forum, to promote efficient government
functioning, should be as compatible with homosexual expression
as it is with heterosexual expression. In rejecting protection for
homosexual expression, the government symbolically stamps its
approval of homophobia and bigotry.
C. Expansion of Protection of Homosexual Expressive Speech
To fight for expanded protection of homosexual expressive
speech, advocates should closely examine the different fora where
the issue has played out and develop a strategy based on this
differential treatment. Homosexual expressive speech tends to
garner the most protection in the university setting, where for
124. Id. at 932-33.
125. Id.
126. See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v.
Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 73
F.3d 172 (8th Cir. 1995).
127. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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decades students have had the power to assemble and advocate for
their rights as homosexuals." 8
However, establishing progressive change in the public
employment setting is probably more useful because that is where
courts balance competing governmental and individual interests.
The Pickering test, central to this evaluation, mandates that the
speech be of public concern in order to guarantee First
Amendment protection.'9 The burden then falls on advocates of
homosexual expressive speech to frame the issue as one of public
concern. To accomplish this, the rhetoric must shift to frame
LGBT issues as a matter of nationwide importance and concern.
This change in perception could filter its way into the courts,
rendering moot the question of whether homosexual expressive
speech is a matter of public concern. Organizers of the LGBT
rights movement and public commentators would be a significant
factor in bringing about this change.
Within the political speech setting, lawmakers as well as
public commentators may play a role in expanding protection of
LGBT expressive rights. Though the Court in Romer was unwilling
to extend First Amendment protection to LGBT rights,' 30 the
decision nonetheless grants local lawmakers stronger footholds.
Here, advocates of LGBT expressive speech could introduce
legislation affirming these rights, thus further enhancing the web of
protection for LGBT expression.
The government's control over LGBT speech is the
strongest within the military setting. While advocates do and
should push for increased expressive rights for LGBT persons in
the military, campaigns to expand LGBT expressive speech
protection are more likely to succeed in the university, public
employment, and political speech arenas.
128. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
129. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
130. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
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CONCLUSION
From the student organization cases to the "Don't
Ask/Don't Tell" cases, there is a relatively small window of
protection for LGBT expressive speech. Advocates of LGBT rights
can, however, work to open this window further. For LGBT
persons, expressive speech is inseparably intertwined with identity,
and American culture purports to value unique identity. This
value, however, is lost on those who cannot express their identities
for fear of retaliation and prejudice. We allow those who would
persecute LGBT persons to cause harm with their speech, but we
offer little speech protection to LGBT persons in affirming their
own identity. It is a perverse reality that the LGBT expressive
speech that renders an LGBT person vulnerable to attack is often
unprotected, when the speech attacking them is fully protected.
